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This paper seeks to present a study of local structures through which global circumstances are
 
negotiated. I have argued elsewhere (Kaim 1997, 1998, 2003a,2003b,2004)that if we are to
 
understand the social and cultural implications of the integration of the whole planet into a
 
single global system we must study the local level. This is the level at which action takes place,
and it is through action that structure is connected to circumstance. The presentation is heavily
 
ethnographic rather than theoretical. However it follows the theoretical points outlined
 
elsewhere (Kaim 1997, 1998, 2003a, 2003b, 2004). It concerns the village of Tustas (not the
 
village’s real name),which is a Palestinian village on the West Bank,nestled in the Judean hills
 
overlooking the Palestinian plain. It is a mixed Christian and Muslim village with a total
 
resident population of approximately 1,000,about two thirds of which is Christian and one third
 
Muslim. In particular I look at the development of social and ecological crisis as indicative of
 
the interaction between local and global forces,structures and circumstances.
Tustas has undergone two major social-economic movements since the mid-nineteenth century.
These changes of historical circumstance have been profoundly important in the development
 
of current structures and dispositions. For this reason,here we are concerned with the relation
 
of social-economic historical circumstances to structures and dispositions. In the earlier
 
Ottoman period social and economic relations were based on an articulating corporate kinship
 
and expressed through clans. In the late nineteenth century emphasis moved to a peasant
 
domestic economy focussed on the household as the unit of production, distribution, and
 
consumption. Since then there has been a second movement to the current situation in which
 
the household has been reduced to a unit of consumption and the individual is the primary
 
economic actor. The relationship of kinship to production was transformed,most basically
 
through Ottoman and British reforms.
The cumulative effects of Turkish land reforms in the second half of the nineteenth century and
 
British land and tax reforms in the early twentieth served to integrate Tustasis into the money
 
economy?. Until the late nineteenth century life in Tustas,as elsewhere in Palestine,was based
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on subsistence production expressed through and based on notions and categories of kinship.
Essentially,through the reforms ownership of land,the primary resource,came to be invested
 
in the individual title-holder rather than kin groups. At the same time, the title-holder had
 
individual responsibility for the payment of taxes owing on the land under title. In this way the
 
previous reliance of individuals and households on co-operative labour within the clan was
 
transformed. The individual title-holder (especially after the British reforms of the 1920s and
 
1930s)was required to make money in order to pay the land tax. In this way,also,the economy
 
was changed from one essentially organised around production for use-value to ensure the
 
livelihood of the community of producers,to one organised around production for exchange-
value and to produce saleable surplus.
These changes had more immediate and hard-hitting practical effects on the villagers,how-
ever. They suffered economic failure and were thrown to the brink of starvation. A combina-
tion of the reforms with local inheritance practices and rising population meant that many
 
villagers had plots too small fully to support their households. Without adequate means of
 
subsistence they could not reproduce themselves economically;they did not have enough to eat.
Acute hunger(aj-ju‘)was common and very real in the late Turkish and early British periods.
Since the British period,when emigration to the Palestinian plain began,a major reason for
 
leaving has been so that the people could eat,rather than simply to increase their income.
The two major social-economic movements referred to (from kin-, through household-, to
 
individual-based economic life)have occurred in the past eighty years. Tustasis’kin concep-
tions have not fully adapted to the change. Previously,the clan provided a social,economic,
and political model. It was a“second government”(hukuma?t tha?nawı?ya);it is no more. The
 
social, economic, and political model provided by the clan is no longer appropriate to the
 
Christian villagers’social-economic organisation. Neither is it fully appropriate to the
 
Muslims’organisation.
Tustasi Muslims have found a modern religio-political structure of authority suitable to their
 
community. That structure is the Muslim Brothers (MB)-Hamas. Because of the communal
 
features discussed elsewhere(Kaim 1997,1998,2003a,2003b,2004)Tustasi Muslims are able to
 
mobilise their people by use of the idea of being ‘asabı??in conjunction with notions of religious
 
unity. In doing this the modern political authority of the MB-Hamas and its activists is
 
legitimated in ostensibly‘traditional’kin and religious terms at the same time as it maintains
 
the efficacy of those terms.
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Tustasi Christians cannot do this because the ideologies of their political parties do not permit
 
such use of kin notions. Rather those ideologies are inimical to such use and explicitly oppose
 
themselves to‘familism’which they see as a source of political impotence,and one which lost
 
them Palestine in the first place?. Moreover, for the reasons discussed in Part One the
 
Christians cannot promote a ‘religious kinship’among themselves whereas the Muslims use
 
religious unity to reinforce their claims of being ‘asabı?.
Social-Ecological Crisis
 
In the Ottoman period Tustas had several areas of land devoted to different uses. It held a piece
 
of land (called an-Nazla)on the Palestinian plain which was devoted to cereals such as wheat
 
and barley. This area was under musha?‘(or,common)ownership. Households were allocated
 
plots of this land which were re-allocated each year. Around the village itself,on the hills on
 
which it stands,were,and still are,extensive terraces under olive trees. Finally,there were
 
vegetable gardens surrounding the built-up area but within the terraced area,divided perma-
nently between the village’s families (‘a?’ila?t). Since the expansion of Tustas’s built-up area in
 
the late nineteenth century the gardens have come to be scattered between houses. The
 
terraced hill land under olives still surrounds this area of houses and their plots.
An-Nazla was sold by village notables in the late nineteenth century. The sale illustrates the
 
point that not all of Tustas’s land was divided fairly among the people who actually cultivated
 
it. The sale of an-Nazla by the notables was possible because they had registered it with the
 
Turkish authorities as their personal property. The inefficiency of Turkish surveys and
 
investigations meant that this was not an uncommon occurrence in Palestine at that time(see
 
Scho?lch 1982;Johnson 1982). Indeed,it was so common that by the time the British arrived they
 
found the national notable elite strongly entrenched precisely because it had consolidated its
 
power and privileges through extensive land accumulation aided by Ottoman policies?. The
 
British were much more efficient in surveying the land and allocating titles to individuals
 
actually cultivating it. Their introduction of a comprehensive system of land registration,
ownership,and taxation(see Government of Palestine 1946)stimulated a major transformation
 
to individual holdings.
Today land of the village is still divided into clan areas. For these purposes the Christians are
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reckoned to constitute two clans,but the Muslims only one. Division into these areas occurred
 
in the early part of the nineteenth century. The Faras took the central area,the Muslims the
 
southern,and the Ghazal the northern zone. Among the Muslims da?r Abu?Mahmu?d took the
 
eastern side of the Muslim area while da?r Abu?Ahmad took an area on the western side. It is
 
important to note that this dominant group was, at that time, considered two clans. The
 
Muslim area was divided into two named sections,in contrast to the single area demarcated
 
during my field work. Thus,at that earlier time the village was divided into four quarters. The
 
different quarters were designated by spatial terms,but were associated with specific clans
 
which had exclusive rights to the use of the land in them. They were called ha?rat ash-sha?mı?ya
(northern quarter),ha?rat al-qiblı?ya (southern quarter),ha?rat al-fauqa(upper quarter),and ha?rat
 
at-tahta (lower quarter). These last two received their designations from their relative
 
placement on sloping ground,and were identified with the two‘hamulas’da?r Abu?Ahmad and
 
da?r Abu?Mahmu?d both of which traced descent from Isha?q. Ha?rat ash-sha?mı?ya was associated
 
with the Ghazal,and ha?rat al-qiblı?ya with the Faras. At the time of my field work while people
 
generally knew of these older designations the haras were more commonly referred to by the
 
names of the hamulas occupying them. Thus, they were generally referred to as ha?rat al-
Ghazal, ha?rat al-Faras, or quarter of the Ghazal and quarter of the Faras respectively.
Significantly,the upper and lower quarters have now been collapsed into one,terminologically
 
at least, reflecting the tendency to refer to the Muslims as a single clan?. They are now
 
designated by the term ha?rat al-muslimı?n (the Muslims’quarter), a designation used by
 
Muslims when objectifying their hara,as much as by Christians,and ha?ratna? (“our quarter”),
used by Muslims only.
In the original division each clan’s holdings were discrete from those of the others indicating
 
a direct and close relation between land and kinship. Muslims now do,however,have land in
 
the areas of the two Christian clans. They acquired these tracts by sale as well as by a system
 
of lending to finance the emigration of large numbers of villagers after 1948. There are also
 
two households from the Faras living in the Ghazal quarter. No Muslims or member of the
 
Ghazal live in the Faras quarter excluding the old village which has had a mixed population
 
since before the division into quarters occurred. Three Muslim families live there. Only one
 
household(consisting of a recently married man and his wife and children)from the Faras lives
 
in the Muslim area,far removed from the other Christians.
Land belonged to the community at large (aj-jami‘)before the Ottoman land reforms. The
 
clans controlled access to land through the allocations made by the village notables,but the
 
34
 
constituent families actually cultivated it. In common perception“our village was［made up of］
clans and the whole country was［made up of］clans.”Each clan conducted its affairs as a unit
 
and quite independently of the others.
Each constituent family of the hamula(or‘a?’ila)had a member,usually a genealogically senior
 
male,who was responsible for it and who oversaw cultivation and distribution of production
 
from the portion allocated to it. The notables generally came from the larger ‘a?’ilas,were
 
themselves genealogically senior,and were reputed to be brave in battle,tough,and generous.
Apart from their role in the division of the village’s immediate lands (which remained of
 
secondary importance for subsistence until the late nineteenth century) the notables also
 
defined and allocated plots on an-Nazla. It was they who divided the whole tract into summer
 
and winter portions and then determined the size,aspect,and allocation of plots within these
 
portions. These plots were allocated to the ‘a?’ilas which were then responsible for their
 
cultivation. The‘a?’ila,through its senior member,oversaw production and divided the produce
 
according to the number and size of the da?rs in it.
Although each‘a?’ila was responsible for a particular allotment the distribution itself had been
 
made by the clan(through the notables)and was liable to be changed each year or so. This was
 
done in order to equalise differences in the productivity of the land itself. In order not to
 
disadvantage a household allocated less productive land it would be given a more productive
 
piece in the following re-allocation. This system thus had a tendency to reduce inequity. This
 
is akin to the tendency of Sahlins’(1972)Domestic Mode of Production to equalise the risk of
 
productive failure between households. The influence of the clan over the land and the
 
subsistence of households was considerable,even though it was the households which actually
 
provided the labour for production. More importantly for us economic activity,from the major
 
division of land to the cultivation of small plots,was articulated through units of kinship.
This situation began to change with the Ottoman reforms of the late nineteenth century which
 
introduced some degree of individual ownership. However,the Turkish effort was haphazard
 
and inefficient compared to the British surveys and reforms of the 1920s and 1930s.
As part of the movement towards the creation of a market in land the Ottomans introduced
 
three waves of laws in the late 1850s,the late 1860s,and the mid-1870s. The best known is that
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of 1858 requiring the registration of land in the names of individual owners,where before it had
 
been treated according to traditional forms of tenure(Khalidi 1988:211;Scho?lch 1982:21)such
 
as I have described. Rather than encouraging a wider dissemination of titles to the peasants
 
actually cultivating the land much was registered in the name of local notables,creating large
 
properties (Scho?lch 1982:22;Johnson 1982:14). This did not happen within Tustas where land
 
in the immediate area of the village was divided into many plots from clan holdings. However,
the power of the clan notables was still strong. When the clans divided their lands and
 
apportioned them to the households this too was done by the notables. The apportioned
 
holdings did,however,then become the property of the household,as did the produce of the
 
land. This follows the pattern of the hill areas where individual ownership was more common
 
in the late nineteenth century(Graham-Brown 1982:108-109).
The division of the 1860s affected the organisation of work and labour relations. In the days
 
before the division the members of a clan worked co-operatively, especially in the harvest.
However,after the division each household ploughed,cultivated,and maintained its own land.
From that time“everyone started to work for himself alone”and the tendency of the previous
 
system to reduce inequity was superseded by one in which there was less co-operation, and
 
greater freedom,but also a greater responsibility on the shoulders of the individual as cultiva-
tor. Not surprisingly,the division also affected productivity.
An economic organisation which emphasises the household as its productive unit subjects the
 
community so organised to specific consequences. To the extent that production is centred on
 
domestic units it is established on a fragile and vulnerable base. The household labour force
 
is usually small and in the face of circumstances a percentage of households must chronically
 
fail to provide their own customary livelihood,or subsistence(Sahlins 1972:74). Control over
 
the disposition of property,such as a title conveys,strengthens the household’s devotion to its
 
own interests. In a system with this base the household itself tends to become the unit charged
 
with production,the deployment and use of labour power,and the determination of economic
 
objectives. From this,the internal relations of the household become the principal relations of
 
production in society(Sahlins 1972:76-77). Such an emphasis on households thus emphasises
 
more individualistic labour relations over more communal ones. It thus also increases the risk
 
of productive failure within the community,from the inter-household or communal point of
 
view.
Within the productive household co-operative relations are likely to be maintained. Living in
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a household which is a productive unit demands a pooling of goods and services to place at the
 
disposition of members what is indispensable to them (Sahlins 1972:94). This is happened in
 
Tustas. Households cultivated and harvested their crops co-operatively between their mem-
bers. The fruits of the harvest were held in common in the household, as were the seeds
 
produced,which were used to plant the crop for the following year, and the store of food.
Brothers would work together throughout the year. They worked in complement,some with
 
the household’s livestock,the remainder tending the land. This was organised by the brothers
 
who then shared equally in the produce. Livestock too was held in common in the household.
Each household had a pair of cattle which were used mainly for ploughing,and also kept flocks
 
of sheep and goats for their milk products,the meat being eaten only occasionally. During this
 
phase of domestic production the relation between brothers became central to economic
 
relations. It is not surprising that relation should provide a model for co-operation within the
 
household once the latter became the primary productive unit. The logic of relatedness worked
 
via connection through a common male ancestor. The relation between brothers is the closest
 
of such relations as the common ancestor is only one generation removed from the protagonists.
With the household as the prime productive unit kinship was still implicated in the economic
 
realm, and provided structures through which economic activity could be organised and
 
expressed. Also,as the household began to separate from the wider kin structures of clan and
 
constituent family(‘a?’ila)maximal reciprocity came to be focussed on it. As an expression of
 
kinship distance and generalised reciprocity(cf.Sahlins 1972:196-204)brotherhood co-ordinat-
ed with the new productive unit very well:for the actors it was‘natural.’
Ottoman reforms had begun a process of individuation that was to continue through the
 
twentieth century until its present culmination in the rural proletarianisation of the villagers
 
and the reduction of the household to a unit of consumption. In the late nineteenth century,
however,the individual was still dependent on the household for subsistence in a way that is not
 
the case in industrial economies. Although movement away from the wider kin structures had
 
begun,full transformation was yet to occur. This is the context in which the villagers lost an
-Nazla,on which they had hitherto depended for their subsistence.
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-
The most important property held in common by the villagers in former times was the piece
 
of land on the plain. Its name,‘an-Nazla,’derives from the verb nazala meaning to go down
 
or descend. The property consisted of approximately 10,000 dunums and was held under musha?‘
(common)ownership whereby the land was not distributed to individuals,but was administered
 
by the clans. Being flat and open country it was better suited to broad field cultivation than
 
the rugged and very rocky land surrounding the village itself.By and large,the land immediate-
ly surrounding the village was uncultivated,but where used was mainly under olives. An-Nazla
 
was used on seasonal rotation between summer and winter sections to provide the bulk of the
 
villagers’food and virtually all the village’s grain supplies. Although common it was controlled
 
by the small clique of village notables. Because of the crucial role of an-Nazla in providing the
 
subsistence of the villagers its loss in the late nineteenth century had dramatic consequences for
 
the village which were felt over decades.
In the previous section we saw how kin relations were the basis of labour relations during the
 
Ottoman period. The fundamental nature of kin relations in economic matters at this time is
 
further illustrated by the manner in which the village received the land in the first place,the
 
economic organisation of the land under village ownership,and the manner in which the village
 
lost the land.
Tustas acquired an-Nazla through a marriage relationship enjoyed by one of the ancient
 
Muslim families of the village,which was in residence before the advent of da?r Isha?q. That
 
relationship was with a family of one‘Arab Abu?Qisheikh,who was an emir and held very
 
extensive lands. In return for taking a woman from this Tustasi family as a bride for one of
 
their number,the grandfather of the groom gave a piece of land to the village as a nuqut,or
 
wedding present;that land was an-Nazla. It was given knowing that the land surrounding the
 
village was little,and what there was waste,and was given to the whole village as a common
 
gift.
The actual events are quite ancient,preceding the arrival of da?r Isha?q which itself came about
 
400 years before my field work. I am not here attempting to reconstruct the events of that
 
distant time. What is important,however,is that the land was a nuqut and that it was received
 
because of a marriage relationship between a family in the village and that of the emir.These
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are the most significant features of this story.Locally a groom is required to give gifts to both
 
his bride and her family.Bridewealth,dowries,and other forms of exchange on marriage are
 
widely recognised in anthropology as forms of reciprocity which cement the link constituted
 
socially through marriage between two notionally separate kin groups. This too is the logic of
 
the nuqut. In this case, however, the nuqut was the transfer of an economically important
 
resource(land)to a village with unproductive property. It therefore also expresses the basis of
 
economic relations in kinship terms. This was appropriate at that time given the relation
 
between kinship and land in the Ottoman period,discussed above.
Once received by the village work on an-Nazla was organised on the following basis. Each
‘a?’ila received a lajna (literally this means committee or commission,but here refers to the land
 
for which the family was given responsibility),which it tended. Although the land was divided
 
into these lajnas it remained in musha?‘ownership. Generally,each‘a?’ila was responsible for its
 
lajna and worked on it with some independence.Labour relations were thus centred on the
‘a?’ilas,and so based on kinship relations. Again,labour was essentially co-operative with the
 
different households making up the‘a?’ila cultivating the land and harvesting its produce. That
 
produce was then distributed to the households within the ‘a?’ila in a process overseen by
 
genealogically senior members of the‘a?’ila. The clan notables could be called to adjudicate in
 
cases of strong dispute over the distribution.
An-Nazla remained common until it was sold to one Abu?Saif,a rich and powerful man from
 
the neighbouring village of Dair Gusna,who oppressed the people. He took it into his head to
 
take an-Nazla by force. The people of Tustas struggled against him and managed to defeat
 
him in that. However,finally it was to no avail. He prevented the people from using the land
 
so that finally it was sold in the early 1880s to this same Abu?Saif and a friend of his nicknamed
 
the Bey,who lived in Jerusalem and was a scion of the Husseini family. The land was not sold
 
by the people, but by the six village notables,without the knowledge of the general village
 
population.
That the land was sold by the village notables indicates the power of this group whose position
 
depended on the link between kin and economic relations. So long as economic relations were
 
based in kinship the notables,as the senior kin figures of the primary kin unit (the clan),could
 
maintain their control over the disposition of land and labour. It is because of this kinship-
economy link that during my field work the politically active villagers,whatever their alle-
giance, denounced the sale as indicative of ‘feudalism’(iqta?‘ı?ya). Adding to the sense of
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betrayal,the clique of notables sold the land to the Husseini family which subsequently sold it
 
to Jews. “Those feudal families were middlemen for the transfer of the land to the Jews. So
 
you see how the land was lost,”the implication being ‘how it was taken from us by our own
 
people’?. Moreover,the loss of an-Nazla is connected to the loss of the Palestinian plain to the
 
extent that the first is interpreted as indicative of the reasons for the second:because the people
 
lacked national consciousness (wa?‘i qaumi) and were dominated by an elite of notables in
 
contrast to the Jews’nationalism and organisation?.
The loss of land helps create a sense of unity in dispossession and provides a symbol for
 
political reflection,criticism,and mobilisation,demonstrated in the importance of‘Land Day’
in the Palestinian national calendar. The political and social importance of the loss of land also
 
allows the local story of an-Nazla to be phrased in terms of modern Palestinian national
 
politics. It is in distinction (sometimes implicit and at others explicit)to that national politics
 
that the story gains power as a criticism of ‘feudalism’and familism. All age groups and
 
members of both of the religious communities of the village as a serious betrayal of their
 
interests. It is particularly taken by the politically active youth,especially PPP activists,to
 
indicate the corrupting effects of the system of familism which betrayed the Palestinians by
 
involving them in counterproductive and politically unconscious strife between the two main
‘great families’of the pre-1948 period,the Husseinis and the Nashashibis. The Jews,to whom
 
the Palestinians were betrayed,had,on the other hand,a developed national consciousness at
 
the beginning of the current century. Even today,in the view of PPP supporters,a concerted
 
effort is needed to eliminate forever the influence of familism and to develop a true national
 
political consciousness,one of the hallmarks of which is that the people will think of them-
selves,first and foremost,as Palestinians,rather than in terms of kin,regional,or even class
 
loyalties. For all groups, however, the influence of the great families and of ‘feudalism’is
 
central in explaining how the Jews“broke us,”that is to say,how they created divisions among
 
the Palestinians so that some worked against the long-term interests of their own people and
 
thus how Israelis could gain control of the land. This idea is current even among those who do
 
not speak of the need for a modern political consciousness,but view the loss of the land simply
 
in terms of betrayal by the traditional leadership.
There is a further point to be made, however. It is true that the traditional logic of the
 
economic system is demonstrated by this event. On the other hand,the fact that the land was
 
sold by the village notables indicates that the traditional economic system was, in fact,
articulated with a more modern structure: that of the money economy. The Ottoman land
 
40
 
reforms discussed earlier acted to encourage the commercialisation of land,as indeed was their
 
intention. Titles were saleable. While not as thorough as the British reforms of the l920s and
 
1930s?the Ottoman reforms began the process and developed it to the extent that trans-
Palestine land sales occurred as early as the 1870s(Scho?lch 1982:22). The sale of an-Nazla is
 
one example of this. In its nature as sold,but by village notables,it indicates the transitional
 
status of the economic organisation of that time.
While the sale of an-Nazla can thus be seen as a consequence of Ottoman reforms, as an
 
historical event it had further consequences itself. The most immediate of these were to throw
 
the people into hunger,to create a need to rehabilitate the lands in and around the village itself,
and to clarify the field system therein. An-Nazla had been used for most of the agricultural
 
production of the village, being flat and more easily cultivable than the hills on which the
 
village stands and which had,therefore,been neglected. The land around the village had been
 
neglected because of its low productivity in comparison with an-Nazla, and the loss of the
 
latter put great pressure on the productive capacities of the village. Furthermore, this loss
 
occurred at the same time as the land reforms of the 1860s promoted a movement towards
 
household production so that when the lands were rehabilitated it was as family,rather than
 
clan or common,plots. As mentioned before domestic production necessarily carries greater
 
risk of productive failure for individual households than a collective system. The combination
 
of this more fragmented economic organisation with the loss of an-Nazla and the need to
 
rehabilitate village lands which had been neglected for a considerable period meant that a
 
decline in productivity was almost certain.
In these circumstances hunger and hardship might be expected. It comes as little surprise then
 
that villagers at that time lived in abject circumstances. Implicated in the hunger and hardship,
however, is the productive crisis which created the hunger and developed the hardship by
 
imposing a need for Tustasis to intensify their labour in order to increase production.
The theoretical orientation of this study takes‘economy’as a category of culture. This implies
 
that the threshold of productive pressure and the character of the response to it are not purely
 
determined by the means of production but are relative to the society under consideration?.
Pressure on land is a function of the producers’access to sufficient means of livelihood. What
 
constitutes that sufficient means is a specification of the cultural system:relations of produc-
tion and property,land tenure,relations between communal groups and so forth. The loss of
 
an-Nazla occurred in a context in which rules of land tenure and economic relations were being
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transformed. Land was becoming an alienable commodity,and there was a greater productive
 
emphasis on the household which was coming to be constituted around the title-holder.
The Turks also introduced a tax regime. As it affected Tustas that regime was rapacious and
 
irregular. Taxes,importantly,were paid in kind. Thus,the requirement to pay taxes made
 
increased production necessary, more so once an-Nazla was lost and basic survival was
 
threatened. The methods available to the villagers to increase their production were limited.
The technology of agriculture offered little improvement,and at this stage(the 1880s)emigra-
tion was difficult because a communications infrastructure was almost absent. Intensification
 
of labour is the main alternative to technological improvement. Population growth is a means
 
to intensify labour on the land. This became the main response in Tustas. The populace needed
 
to rehabilitate the land surrounding the village. Given the circumstances just mentioned
 
increasing the population would ease that rehabilitation. Furthermore, given the structural
 
disposition of households with relatively few workers to falter economically,and that Tustas
 
had begun to emphasise the household prior to the loss of an-Nazla,increasing the number of
 
workers per household would (with luck)reduce each household’s risk of economic failure. In
 
this context such economic failure meant hunger.
Thus the Tustasis were caught in a vicious circle in that they could not use any but traditional
 
materials in their cultivation so that if they wanted to farm the lands of the village to their full
 
extent they needed to raise more children as labour. Any such increase in fertility would put
 
severe pressure on a family’s subsistence,however,and further deepen hardship. In spite of this
 
there was considerable population growth in Tustas. The growth was so great that it forced
 
an expansion of the village in the 1890s. Over the past hundred years Tustas has seen a
 
considerable expansion of its built-up area. This was caused by two developments:greater
 
security obtaining in the area,particularly following the expansion of central authority to rural
 
districts as occurred under the British,as well as a greatly increasing population.
Prior to this movement all the families lived in what is now the central part of the village,
recognisable by the predominance of da?r enclosures in which groups of related families lived.
In this old part of the village there were no areas identified with any particular religious or kin
 
group. While the families within each da?r enclosure were related,the neighbouring compound
 
might be occupied by people from another clan. Indeed, there was no territorial exclusivity
 
between the confessions:a Muslim’s neighbours in the next compound might well be Christians.
Judging by the style of buildings and their age there had been no expansion for a considerable
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period before the late nineteenth century.
Conditions in these houses became exceedingly crowded with two or more nuclear families
 
having to share single rooms. With no space available in that part of the village on which new
 
houses might be built,expansion was necessary. The first movements out occurred in the 1890s.
Three families,two Christian and one Muslim,moved out. The Muslim family,of da?r Isha?q,
moved into what is now the Muslim quarter. This was in 1890??. Two years later (according
 
to the dates displayed in the wall of the house concerned)a household from the Faras built a
 
house near the mosque. At the same time a house was built between the mosque and the new
 
house of those Christians for other members of the Faras.
The hunger and hardship of the period did not only lead to a population explosion (however
 
paradoxical such an explosion may appear in our comfortable circumstances). They also
 
provided impetus and a logic for emigration which similarly exploded in the British period.
Rehabilitation of the village lands was not sufficient and work outside the village was necessary
 
to supplement the meagre agricultural production that these hill-dwellers were forced to rely
 
on. Agriculture was not sufficient to provide subsistence. People emigrated in order to have
 
enough to eat. Those who left did so because“they wanted to eat and to earn money”;“they
 
wanted bread for the children to eat”;“the land was not enough”. People left in order to
 
provide the most basic necessities,not to have better food or consumer goods,but to have food.
Thus the elderly Muslim Abu?Walid,old enough to remember the Turkish period,said,by way
 
of personal illustration,“I had five children. My land will not support five people. It just isn’
t possible. This is the principal reason we all had to go:the land does not produce enough to
 
support everybody.”
The failure of subsistence in the late Turkish period,growing population,and the household as
 
the (vulnerable) productive base of the community formed a set of circumstances which
 
established a disposition to emigration. These circumstances in conjunction with the Manda-
tory Power’s systematic introduction of land titles and taxes together with the building of a
 
national communications infrastructure led to a burst of emigration early in the Mandate
 
period. This continued after 1948 until opportunities abroad were severely limited in the 1980s.
By this later date,however,the Palestinian plain was again open to the villagers for employ-
ment. They now‘emigrate’to work in Israel,though resident on the West Bank. The logic
 
remains the same as that established in this productive crisis of the late Ottoman period:that
 
the villagers are unable to reproduce themselves economically through production in the village
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alone.
１ An overview of these reforms and their effects and the integration of the area into the world
 
economy may be found in Owen (1981;1982). Doumani(1995)examines the processes of Ottoman
 
reform and European expansion and their local effects by examining in detail the case of Na?blus
 
and in so doing gives useful insights into the way those forces played themselves out locally and
 
how they were dealt with by the inhabitants. More general historical background on Ottoman rule
 
in Palestine may be found in Cohen (1973)and Cohen and Lewis (1978). On the changes brought
 
about by the incorporation of peasants into the wider economy during the Mandate period see
 
Taqqu (1980). Stein (1980)discusses the forces contributing to the commoditisation of land under
 
the Mandate.
２ and able to proclaim themselves a single clan.
３ This,of course,itself derives from the historical development of those ideologies in opposition
 
to the pre-existing familism and factionalism which so dominated Palestinian politics until the
 
collapse of Palestinian society in 1948. Muslih (1988)provides a useful account of the effects of
 
Palestinian familism on the development of a generalised modern Palestinian nationalism.
Significantly,the strong influence of the great ‘national’notable families (rather than local ones
 
such as those in Tustas)was itself tied to the Ottoman reforms,European penetration and the
 
related economic development in Palestine in the late nineteenth century. These all served to
 
enhance the economic,social,and political position of those national notable families. Sahliyeh
(1988)argues that such elite dominance of politics,even down to the local level,was not overcome
 
until after 1967. This is not to say,however,that the notables could not use nationalist politics for
 
their own ends. Indeed,as Khalaf(1991)has demonstrated,on the national level such notables were
 
at the forefront of the nationalist and anti-colonialist movement under the Mandate. Nevertheless,
such kin-based factionalism on the national level was,as Tustasis themselves feel,integral to the
 
disintegration of Palestinian society and politics in 1948.
４ On this,and the subsequent effects this strength of the notables had on Palestinian politics see
 
Khalaf(1991).
５ See diagram. Two axes in complex relation are involved here:north/south and upper/lower.
The transformation may be represented as follows:
６ Cf. Atran (1986). On land classification, registration, ownership and rental and the role of
 
notables in late Ottoman and Mandatory Palestine more generally,see also Stein (1984).
７ Muslih (1988)provides a useful account of the politics of Palestinian notable families,including
 
the Husseinis and Nashashibis, and their effects on the development of a modern Palestinian
 
nationalism. The social and political position of such families was enhanced by Ottoman reforms
 
and economic developments related to the expansion of Europe and the integration of Palestine
 
44
 
into the world economy. This has been further explored by Khalaf(1991)in his examination of the
 
role of kin relations and loyalties in promoting political factionalism among Palestinians until 1948.
８ On the commoditisation of land under the Mandate see Stein (1980).
９ Cf.Sahlins 1972:49 n.5.
10 Houses in the area have their dates of construction recorded on their walls or ceilings. I was thus
 
able to date each house.
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